Seismology plays an important role in characterizing potential underground nuclear tests. Using broad-band digital seismic data from Northeast China, South Korea and Japan, we investigated the properties of the recent seismic event occurred in North Korea on 2016 January 6. Using a relative location method and choosing the previous 2006 explosion as the master event, the 2016 event was located within the North Korean nuclear test site, with its epicentre at latitude 41.3003 • N and longitude 129.0678 • E, approximately 900 m north and 500 m west of the previous event on 2013 February 12. Based on the error ellipse, the relocation uncertainty was approximately 70 m. Using the P/S spectral ratios, including Pg/Lg, Pn/Lg and Pn/Sn, as the discriminants, we identify the 2016 event as an explosion rather than an earthquake. The body-wave magnitude calculated from regional wave Lg is m b (Lg) equal to 4.7 ± 0.2. Adopting an empirical magnitude-yield relation, and assuming that the explosion is fully coupled and detonated at a normally scaled depth, we find that the seismic yield is about 4 kt, with the uncertainties allowing a range from 2 to 8 kt.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
According to the international media and nuclear monitoring agencies, a seismic event with a magnitude ∼5.0 occurred near the North Korean nuclear test site (NKTS) at 01:30 (UTC) on 2016 January 6. Earlier, nuclear tests had been conducted at NKTS on 2006 October 9, 2009 May 25 and 2013 February 12. Regional seismic phases from these nuclear tests were recorded by broad-band digital stations installed in Northeast China, South Korea and Japan. Fig. 1 shows examples of broad-band waveforms from these nuclear tests and the 2016 event, recorded at station MDJ. All four seismograms show highly consistent waveforms, abrupt primary P-wave arrivals, weak Lg phases and well-developed short-period Rayleigh waves, all typical for shallow explosive sources (e.g. Richards & Kim 2007) .
The three major tasks for seismological investigations of potential nuclear tests are: (i) finding the epicentre of the event (Schaff & Richards 2004; Schlittenhardt et al. 2010; Selby 2010; Wen & Long 2010; Murphy et al. 2013; Zhang & Wen 2013; Zhao et al. 2014 ), (ii) identifying the characteristics of the event to determine if it is an explosion or an earthquake (e.g. Richards & Kim 2007; Zhao et al. 2008; Shin et al. 2010; Murphy et al. 2013) ; and (iii) determining the seismic magnitude and estimating the seismic yield (e.g. Zhao et al. 2008 Zhao et al. , 2012 Zhao et al. , 2014 Murphy et al. 2013; Zhang & Wen 2013) . The 2016 event generated abundant regional seismic signals over distances from a few hundred to a few thousand kilometres. We collected broad-band digital waveforms recorded on the China National Digital Seismic Network (CNDSN), the Global Seismic Network (GSN) and the Japan F-NET to investigate this event. The results confirm that this is another underground nuclear test. In the remainder of this paper, we report the details of our investigations. For convenience, we refer to the events in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016 as NKT1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
H I G H -P R E C I S I O N E V E N T R E L O C AT I O N
Relying on Pn differential traveltimes and the selection of a master event, the relative location method (Schaff & Richards 2004; Selby 2010; Wen & Long 2010; Murphy et al. 2013; Zhang & Wen 2013; Zhao et al. 2014) provides highly accurate event locations relative to the master event. Zhao et al. (2014) used this method to determine the origin times and locations of NKT2 and NKT3 relative to NKT1. The Pn differential traveltimes from NKT4 provide us with information to determine the origin time and location of this event and to update the locations of NKT2 and NKT3 with improved accuracy. We still use NKT1 as the primary master event and adopt the origin time and location reported by the US Geological Survey (USGS) based on satellite images (Wen & Long 2010 ) to simultaneously constrain the locations and origin times for NKT2, NKT3 and NKT4. Seismograms from 95 regional seismic stations are used in the relocation (Supporting Information Fig. S1 , Tables S1 and S2). To calculate the differential traveltimes (Schaff & Richards 2004) , the Pn waveforms are bandpass filtered between 2.0 and 10.0 Hz and sampled in a 2-s time window starting from the Pn first arrival (Supporting Information Fig. S2 ). Then, cross-correlations are calculated between waveforms from different events recorded at the same stations to obtain 238 Pn differential traveltimes (Supporting Information  Table S2 ).
Previous North Korean nuclear tests were detonated close to each other. For a given station, the instrument and site responses are the same, and propagation paths to different events are nearly the same, except for the short section beneath the NKTS. The differential traveltimes between the different events mainly resulted from their origin times, epicentre locations, burial depths and the Pn velocity beneath the test site. Because of the trade-off between depth and origin time, we include only the origin times in the calculation. Finally, a model with 10 parameters is created: the longitudes and latitudes of NKT2, NKT3 and NKT4; the Pn velocity beneath the test site; and the three origin times, which are used to fit the observed Pn differential traveltimes. Because the stations are unevenly distributed azimuthally, we group the differential traveltimes into 20 • azimuthal bins and set up a weighting function to balance their contributions. All results, along with their uncertainties, are listed in Table 1 . The best-fit epicentre of NKT4 is [41.3003 • N, 129.0678 • E]. Based on the error ellipses (Allan 1972) , the uncertainty of the relative location is approximately 70 m. In Fig. 2 , the epicentre of NKT4 is approximately 900 m north and 500 m west of NKT3, and 3700 m and 1000 m away from NKT1 and NKT2, respectively. NKT4 appears to be on the same mountain as NKT2 and NKT3 but on a different side. The best-fit origin time for NKT4 is 01:30:00.9706 ± 0.0015 UTC. The uppermost mantle P-wave velocity beneath the test site is estimated to be 7.99 ± 0.11 km s −1 , which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Wang et al. 2003; Hearn et al. 2004; Liang et al. 2004; Zhao et al. 2012 Zhao et al. , 2014 . All parameters obtained are relative and by assuming that the parameters for NKT1 are accurate.
E V E N T D I S C R I M I N AT I O N B A S E D O N P / S -T Y P E S P E C T R A L R AT I O S
Ideally, an isotropic explosion source mainly generates P waves and is a poor S-wave source. In contrast, a natural earthquake is caused by fault slips, which can be described by a double-couple source that radiates abundant S waves. Therefore, the P-and S-wave energy radiated from a seismic source can be an important indicator for discriminating the properties of the source. Traditionally, the differences between body-wave magnitude and surface wave magnitude were used to discriminate explosion sources from earthquake sources at global distances. Similarly, the P/S-type spectral ratios of regional phases, that is, Pg/Lg, Pn/Lg and Pn/Sn, have been widely used for the same purpose at regional distances (Taylor et al. 1989; Walter et al. 1995; Xie 2002; Fisk 2006; Richards & Kim 2007) . Because of the randomness caused by certain local effects, observations from individual stations may encounter difficulty when separating explosions from earthquakes (e.g. Richards & Kim 2007) , particularly at lower frequencies. This problem, however, can be overcome using network statistics (Zhao et al. 2008 (Zhao et al. , 2014 . We use four NKTS explosions and four natural earthquakes near the NKTS to test the source discrimination (Supporting Information Table S3 ). The regional phases Pn, Pg, Sn and Lg are sampled from vertical-component displacement waveforms at stations with purely continental paths. After correcting for distance (Hartse et al. 1997; Zhao et al. 2008) and eliminating data with signal-to-noise ratios below 1.8, we calculate the P/S type spectral ratios Pg/Lg, Pn/Lg and Pn/Sn at individual stations. Fig. 3(a) shows examples of spectral ratios calculated for explosion NKT2 and an m b 4.6 earthquake that occurred on 2002 April 16, and the different symbols represent observations from individual stations, with solid circles and error bars indicating network averaged mean values and their Table S3 ).
at Institute of Geology and Geophysics, CAS on July 11, 2016 http://gji.oxfordjournals.org/ standard deviations, and the red and black colours indicating explosions and earthquakes, respectively. These single-station observations show a clear tendency for explosive sources to radiate more P-wave energy relative to earthquakes. However, the single-station results are rather scattered, particularly at low and high frequencies. Conversely, the network average increases the reliability of the separation . Figs 3(b)-(d) show the network averaged spectral ratios from four NKTS explosions and four natural earthquakes, with the black symbols representing earthquakes, the red symbols indicating NKT1-3, and the blue symbols indicating NKT4. In all cases, the explosion and earthquake populations can be completely discriminated at frequencies above 2.0 Hz, thereby indicating that an underground nuclear explosion within this magnitude range that is detonated in the China-North Korea border region can be unambiguously screened by a regional seismic network.
E V E N T M A G N I T U D E A N D Y I E L D E S T I M AT I O N
The seismic yield of an underground nuclear explosion can be estimated through its magnitude using an empirical magnitude-yield relation (Nuttli 1986; Ringdal et al. 1992; Murphy 1996; Bowers et al. 2001; Zhao et al. 2008 Zhao et al. , 2012 Zhang & Wen 2013) . We used an 11-station regional seismic network (Fig. 4a) to calculate the Lgwave magnitude. The network and the Lg-wave magnitude were precalibrated with a historical data set composed of 99 regional events with both m b (P) and m b (Lg) measurements (Supporting Information  Table S3 ), and a regional Lg-wave attenuation model (Zhao et al. 2008; Zhao et al. 2010) . Using the calibrated network the Lg-wave magnitude for NKT4 is m b (Lg) = 4.7 ± 0.2, which should be equivalent to global body-wave magnitude m b (P) and can be used with the empirical relations obtained based on the global body-wave magnitude (e.g. Nuttli 1986 ).
Because the NKTS is an uncalibrated test site, it is necessary to adopt a suitable empirical magnitude-yield relation from other calibrated region, for example, those at the Nevada test site (NTS; Nuttli 1986), Novaya Zemlya (Bowers et al. 2001) and East Kazakhstan (Ringdal et al. 1992; Murphy 1996; Fig. 4b) . The North Korean test site is located in a stable platform. The tectonic sitting and upper-mantle Pn-wave velocity are similar to the test sits in platform areas, for example, East Kazakhstan or Novaya Zemlya, and unlike the NTS located in a more active region (Zhao et al. 2008 (Zhao et al. , 2012 (Zhao et al. , 2014 Murphy et al. 2013) . Based on these, we choose the fully coupled hard-rock site equation by Bowers et al. (2001) for the NKTS. Using this relationship, the estimated yield for NKT4 is 4 kt. The ±0.2 magnitude measurement error, when transferred to yield, can cause an uncertainty between 2 and 8 kt. The above estimation assumes a normally scaled burial depth for the source. However, if the source is greatly overburied, the yield may be underestimated.
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
Based on broad-band regional seismic data recorded in Northeast China, South Korea and Japan, we investigated the seismic characteristics of the 2016 January 6 event in North Korea and confirmed that the event was an underground nuclear test at the NKTS. Using a relative location method and NKT1 as the master event, the locations and origin times of NKT2, NKT3 and NKT4 were determined. In general, these results are consistent with that of previous reports (e.g. Wen & Long 2010; Zhang & Wen 2013; Zhao et al. 2014) . Although the relative location method is rather accurate, certain errors may occur. The local 3-D structure near the source can cause additional scattering, which would complicate the waveforms and cause errors in the cross-correlations. For an example, the Pn waveform from the 2006 event presented certain differences with the records from other events because the location of the 2006 event was further east, and these differences may cause additional errors when locating the epicentre. The P/S-type spectral ratios are effective discriminants for separating explosions from earthquakes and are especially reliable if network statistics are used. By using the network average, the P/S spectral ratios can separate explosions from nearby earthquakes at frequencies above 2 Hz. This result indicates that if an underground nuclear test similar to the North Korean explosions is detonated in this region, then it will likely be discriminated by a regional seismic network. Since NKTS is an uncalibrated test site, and given the uncertainties in transferring empirical magnitude-yield relations to NKTS, replacing global m b with m b (Lg), and allowing for differences in near source geology, at Institute of Geology and Geophysics, CAS on July 11, 2016 http://gji.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from the yield estimate is uncertain between 2 and 8 kt which, furthermore, will still be greatly expanded when considering the source depth uncertainty.
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